Homegrown Terrorism Australia Assignment Sample

The Best Strategies to Counter-Terrorism in General

Chapter 1 - Introduction to Homegrown Terrorism Australia

Australia is one of the biggest countries with 25 million people. It is located in the southern pacific province. One of the major threats in the country is the rising incidents of homegrown terrorism. Also home grew terrorism is a kind of terrorism in which victims in a country are targeted by a perpetrator with similar citizenship as the victims (Esfandiary 2017, 455-469). After the September 11 attack, the country realized that there is an urgent need to empower the security systems. The September attacks killed 10 Australian people and the October Bali bombings execute 88 Australian. In addition, the Bali bombing attack clear that Australia is the major target of homegrown terrorism. The evidence revealed that the major source of new terrorist warnings starts from the international jihadist group majorly known as Jemaah Islamiyah (Welch 2016, 165). However, the counter-terrorism movement was effective in identifying these groups. It is highly necessary to understand the real origin of homegrown terrorism which influences the native people to commit violence in their own country.

The country has been slightly successful in tackling violence in its native soil. However, over a hundred Australians were affected due to the terrorist attacks in 2001. The evidence specified that an effective counterterrorism strategy may work well in dealing with these attacks (Zekulin 2016, 46-66). However homegrown activists play a very crucial role to conduct an investigation to identify the rising terrorism activities most adequately. In the recent scenario, the augmentation in the terrorist activities has specified the need for a robust and effective security system. For instance, in 2015 the Islamic state propaganda specified that an Australian adolescent Jake Miller was included in the group of suicide bombers who performed a major attack on Iraq. Furthermore, the evidence specified that he was connected to a suicide bombing hit in Iraq and the system revealed resources for improving unplanned explosive devices at his family home before he goes to Syria.

Evidence specified that in 2014 a young person was shot at the Endeavour Hills police station after attacking different police officials at the Melbourne police station. In addition, the evidence revealed that over a hundred citizens in Australia are vigorously supporting these terrorist groups (Hughes 2017). Also, some citizens are providing funding and resources so that these groups can employ new people. In 2014 and 2015 the country developed its governmental reaction in order to deal with the danger of Australian nationals who are fighting with or empathizing with Islamic militant groups in Iraq and Syria. During 2014 the country declared on novel legislation to stop citizens from going to battle in the Middle East. It also put up a new Counter-Terrorism aspect in the airport to cease departing Fighters and raise its threat threats on warning level. This step has integrated a planned exclusion on overseas hate preacher in October 2014. Furthermore, the sanction of a safety law makes a new offense of "advocating intimidation" and a prohibition on natives who go to certain conflict regions.

• Background to Conflicts

The evidence specified that the threat of terrorism was present in Australia even before the Al-Qaeda attack on the United States. Although the country did not have a native guideline against terrorism which replicate the position that intimidation was not a severe threat facing Australia before the actions that outspread in the wake of the September 2001 attacks (Shaffer 2020, 1-5). After this scenario, Australia witnessed numerous bombings and other violent acts and most of them were targeted at foreign political missions. However, these attacks specified that their main target was not Australia or Australians. It has been identified that foreign terrorists involved with international Jihadists terrorism to affect the Welfare and security of Australia. However, Al-Qaeda never begins an attack on Australian soil but it did discover the likelihood of doing so. In the year 2000 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the organizer behind the 9/11 attacks on the United States meets with a person Jack Roche. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed teaches him to identify possible Israeli and Jewish teams in Australia and to hire other Australian operatives to help in the implementation of the plant attacks. Furthermore the attacks on Yugoslav General Trade Agency in Sydney, the 1978 bombing of the Sydney Hilton hotel which executes three people and major incidents revealed the intentions of home-based terrorists.

1.2 Other Terrorist Organizations

Homegrown jihadists and other terrorist groups are still present in the country. The counter-terrorism affects the efforts of the country to focus on assessing the risk of these attacks. Furthermore, it is also clear that International terrorist support groups and got major support from these home-based terrorist groups (Millett 2020, 25-50). The fanatic events they sustain do not view Australia or Australians as an aim for their violence but a few may recognize that Australia could be used as an appropriate or favorable place for an attack on their enemy. This includes a group with a long past of unity in the fanatic act and a present skill to praise them, like Lebanese Hizballah’s External Security Organization.

1.3 communal violence threat environments in Australia

Although Sunni Islamist fanaticism is the major terrorist risk facing Australia, other group goes on to connect in politically motivated aggression and the encouragement of public hostility. These groups are diverse and have differing agendas, including severe right-wing and intense left-wing philosophy. Small subsets of persons in these groups are eager to use brutality to strengthen their welfare (Ezeani 2017, 22). While their actions are concerning, they remain a small part of their broader activities and are currently improbable to lead to wide-scale hostility or pose a danger to communal consistency. Hostility at remonstration in Australia is uncommon, and the huge majority of protest attendees is nonviolent and sustains Australia’s independent principles. Social discussion around anti-Islam and anti-migration matter has augmented, and communal dissent has become more common. Recently, violence and dispute have typically included small-scale conflict among right-wing and left-wing antagonists at the anti-Islam protest, or dissenter targeting police force maintaining public order. Other groups with the abroad nationalist program are characterized in Australia, but their association is small and their control is restricted. Furthermore, Actions in support of overseas matter are typically restricted to fundraising and ideological support.

1.4 Terrorist threat: onshore and offshore

The risk of terrorism in Australia remains high with some Australian based activists maintaining the intention and capability to carry out a tax onshore in 2014. In addition, nationwide terrorism third Level was increased and there have been 7 attacks targeting different people and 16 main counter-terrorism disruption operations were used as a reaction to attack planning in Australia (McCormick 2018). Since 2016 the rate of these attacks and disruption has decreased however the terrorism-related incidents occur continuously in Australia and affect the number of people. The frequency of these attacks and disruptions indicates that homegrown terrorism is actively planning terrorist attacks for the future.

 Furthermore, the principal basis of the terrorist threat remains Sunni Islamist extremism and origin mainly from small groups and persons and encouraged by fanatic International groups. In addition, International groups continue to support aggressive principles which resonate with various Australia based extremist for the more frequent calls for a tag in the West will continue to unfavorably form the safety atmosphere of Australia. Other structures of fanaticism are presently less probable to notice the hostility over the next 12 months (Hoffman 2016).

The target inclinations of onshore extremists are more probable to aim at 'soft' targets like the huge crowd in public places, over objective such as transportation, where better physical security actions exist. Whilst the representative plea of violence against an administration or power such as the armed forces, police, and security organization remains, the effortlessly available target can decrease the ability necessary to start an unbeaten terrorist attack (Kam 2016, 581-604). In addition, terrorist targeting of packed places, in particular, has featured in current terrorist attacks both onshore and internationally. Low-capability violence targeting inhabitants fulfills a number of key fanatic aims, including sufferers, community terror and nervousness, and media concentration.

• Any radical attack in Australia for at least the next 12 months is more probable to be low cost, locally sponsored and uses voluntarily acquire arms and comparatively easy strategy. Though, terrorists are imaginative and could utilize novel and pioneering weapons and devices.

Chapter 2 - the Influence of Offshore Terrorist Groups

The Islamic regions of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have mislaid its entire previous territory. In addition ISIL’s capability to develop external attack plan from the conflict region may have been weakening because of continued fatalities. The group continues to encourage attacks internationally including against the West. ISIL's aggressive Islamist terrorist beliefs preserve its request with extremists, many of whom persist to draw motivation from progress in the Syria and Iraq conflict region to validate radical narratives (Ilardi 2018, 474-490). However, the Calls by the ISIL group for the attack in the West are possible to continue.

Islamist fanatic groups and followers will continue to circulate propaganda planned to radicalize, employ, and encourage terrorist attacks in the West and Australia. Also the only part of propaganda in remoteness is improbable to be the sole means for onshore violence. The country remains worried that the support through the propaganda of specific weapons or methods may augment the probability of homegrown terrorism.

2.1 Australian travelers to the conflict zone

Australian overseas troops may take months or even years to come back to Australia. A number of Australians have come back previously, and further returnees, comprise women and offspring, are expected (Harris-Hogan 2016, 6-24). Whether these persons present a constant risk and their intentions will depend on their thought and readiness to add in violence onshore. A small number of Australians persist to hold a purpose to visit the Syria and Iraq conflict region. However, Prohibited or aspiration explorer may uphold their fanatic philosophy. It is possible that these persons could move from seeking to tour to prepare to carry out an attack on native land.

2.2 Intense right-wing terrorism in Australia

The risk from the severe right-wing in the country has augmented in current years. Furthermore, the severe right-wing groups in Australia are more consistent and prepared than they have been over previous years, and will remain a continuing danger. Any potential intense right-wing-inspire attack in Australia would most probable below potential and carry out by a single actor or little group; though a refined arms attack is probable (Williams 2019, 1327-1341).

.2.3 Communal bloodshed and aggressive protest

Australia continues to benefit from an elevated intensity of community consistency, and public hostility is uncommon. The old acts of communal brutality in Australia have mainly arisen because of home or global actions that resonate with the refugee community (Levitt 2017). The most possible structure of the appearance of public stress will be through community actions and protest intended at drawing the concentration of the broader Australian society towards the detailed matter. Furthermore, the violent objection in Australia continues to be unusual, and the enormous mainstream of complaint action end quietly. Where brutality has occurred, it has usually been opportunistic rather than pre-planned. Over the next 12 months, an act of opportunistic unkindness or social noncompliance at remonstration is probable, mainly those attend by counter-protesters.

Chapter 3 - Best Strategies to Counter-Terrorism

Counterterrorism strategy is an effective government approach to use the instruments of national power to weaken terrorists and their associations and their networks to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and took by the government and its people to react in accordance with the terrorist’s objectives. The effective planning of attacks requires sufficient support fund and the capability to travel and the other type of material support in addition comprehensive and strategic approach and effective policies are required to tackle these kinds of attacks the strategic approach of counterterrorism often include different objectives which are highly effective in addressing different stages of terrorism (Poynting 2018, 213). Furthermore, these objectives were further divided into different categories:

• To prevent man and women from connecting to these terrorist groups
• Providing support and opportunities to people so that they can find the right opportunities for themselves
• Restricting any kind of support resources and individuals that are highly essential for a plant attack
• Preparing and protecting against, fanatic assault, to reduce the susceptibility of possible aim, in particular, significant transportation
• follow the terrorist suspect to detain them and bring them to integrity
• React to terrorist attacks through balanced actions to alleviate the effects of such an attack and to help sufferers.

The state has a compulsion to offer safety against the act of hostility, and this necessitates that they put major stress on eliminating terrorism. This is reflecting in their global authorized duty and political assurance. The UN international Counter-Terrorism approaches particularly describe an effective approach to counterterrorism that includes:

3.1 Strategies to tackle circumstances that are favorable to the increase of terrorism;

Effective approaches to stop and battle terrorism and a strategy to guarantee admiration for civil rights and the rule of law as the primary basis of the battle against violence. As states and nations try to discover more effectual ways of stop terrorism, superior strategies are made to find out why and how people turn to violence in the initial place, and how this can be evaded during the initial stage (Combs 2017). Furthermore different States have emphasized the requirement to effectively recognize and defy the occurrence of violent extremism through a multidimensional technique

3.2 Countering brutal Extremism that Leads to Terrorism

An effective and sustainable approach is required to tackle violent extremism that leads to terrorism. Furthermore, it must be carried out at all events in harmony with the regulation of proclamation and global human rights principles. The state reaction to the danger of violent extremism must be evidence-based and balanced to evade losing the faith and support of the community, as well as to evade oppression and another type of unintentional legalization of fanatic narratives. Furthermore, it cannot be restricted to oppressive events focused on following terrorists, refute them resources, and upsetting their strategy (Dunn 2016, 196-211). The conventional counterterrorism work of law enforcement and intelligence agencies desires to be supplement with deterrence efforts to deal with circumstances that are favorable to the increase of terrorism, interrupt terrorist radicalization, and stem employment. Furthermore different countries have acknowledged the necessity to tackle a variety of communal, financial, supporting, and other factors, plus aggressive autonomy and radicalism that produce situations in which terrorist associations are competent to employ and win support (Onapajo 2020, 1-17). The number of terrorists has designed a precise strategy and put noteworthy efforts into this.

3.3 Community-oriented approach to Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism strategy and practice mainly target society for gathering and enforcement actions determined by the safety priority of the state. They have paid attention to strategy like using the police stop-and-search power, covert process, and intelligence-gathering process to notice supposed terrorists and ruin their actions, particularly active tactics for attacks. These techniques are a compulsory element of any capable approach to contradicting terrorism but must be carried out at all times within a structure based upon the regulation of law and admiration for civil liberties. This process, though, engages small or no discussion or affiliation with members and groups from the community (Rane 2019, 246). They are not focused on gaining belief and support from women and men in local society and not often take into deliberation their varied requirements or how they are influenced by violence and actions against it. 

3.4 Multi-stakeholder Approach to Counterterrorism

A multi-stakeholder method to counterterrorism brings mutually an extensive variety of actors beyond conventional safety practitioners like the police force. It may comprise actors from both the community and confidential segment, add to prevent, fighting, and react to acts of terrorism in their personal role or proficiency, in harmony with the regulation. The real capacity and character of this multi-stakeholder teamwork will differ and rely on the particular matter at stake. On the side of public establishment, counterterrorism has been progressively carried out throughout bureau collaboration and harmonization, concerning conventional actors from the safety and criminal integrity division, in specific the police (Chubb 2020, 1-18). Though with the increasing stress on eliminating terrorism necessitates a multidisciplinary method and a different number of added community establishments, such as communal and wellbeing services have been bringing collectively. In this background, it is significant to recognize and keep in mind what the duties of these diverse agencies and organizations are. Community-oriented strategy and actions for tackling terrorism distinguish and highlight the role of the civic at large, individual citizens, particular society and their associate, community-based group, and other social culture and private segment association in common, making them vigorous stakeholders in counterterrorism. These stakeholders require being confident and authorize to add to oppose terrorism, in particular concerning anticipation, attentiveness, primary reaction, and revival.

3.5 Deny terrorist’s entry to Australia and interrupt their travel globally.

It is necessary to find the sources that support terrorists to go globally and across and in borders which considerably obstruct their mobility and can slow down their efficacy. They depend on the illegal system to ease travel and frequently get fake ID papers through robbery or in-house forgery operation. The agencies must focus on identifying the activities of these groups in order to collect much information about their planning (Nugier 2016, 77-84). Furthermore, agencies must continue to improve the safety of the Australian citizens through a covered structure of safety along our boundaries, at the seaport, on our roadways and railways, in the sky, and with global associates. In addition, it is necessary to expand and improve safety practices and expertise to decrease susceptibility in the dynamic transportation system, restrain terrorists from passing Australian boundaries, and notice and stop terrorist journeys in the country. The major efforts will comprise progress all features of aviation safety; endorse secure journey and individuality documents; distracting travel facilitation system; improving border defense and travel permit viewing, and building global ability and enhancing global information exchange to safe travel and battle terrorist travel. Furthermore the National plan to battle Terrorist Travel and National approach for Maritime Security will assist direct the necessary efforts.

3.6 Prevent attacks by terrorist networks

A regime has no superior compulsion than to guard the life and livelihood of its people. In addition, the terrorist cannot be rehabilitated or discourage; they will be tracked down, imprison, or execute. They will be eliminated from the system of community, institute, and other possessions they depend on for support and that ease their actions (Santana-Gallego 2016, 1-28). The system, in turn, will be discouraged, interrupt, and immobilize. In addition functioning with dedicated associates across the world, agencies can continue to use a extensive variety of instruments at home and overseas to take the fight to the terrorists, refute them entry to Australia, hamper their progress across global borders, and create defensive measures to further decrease their exposure to attack. With the help of an effective counter-terrorism strategy, the government and organizations can affect the planning of these attacks.

3.7 Stopping natives from becoming terrorist

The most capable protection against terrorism is to stop people from becoming fanatic in the primary place. There is no procedure or method for radicalization to aggressive fanaticism. The precise amalgamation of source and drivers are exclusive to each individual. Despite the actuality that the Al Qaeda group continues to offer motivation to other radical associations as well as to home-based jihadists in Australia. The evidence revealed that Australia is not the priority of Al Qaeda's future attacks. Australia currently removes its troop in Afghanistan in order to eliminate the additional cause for aggression (Fahadayna 2020). Furthermore, the effective local counter-terrorism approach country shares with the area, JI (Jemaah Islamiyah) no longer has an existence in Australia and the association among JI and Al Qaeda central has also been detached. Australia has also collaborated with the United States and other countries to mortify the JI's operational ability in Indonesia, where it is supposed to be most lively.

As a consequence, Indonesia has not observed an attack against Western targets since the 2009 Jakarta hotel bomb attack. Therefore, the overall risk evaluation for Al Qaeda violence on Australian soil is low. Homegrown Islamic fanatic, or self-styled jihadists, cause the most severe danger to Australia today. It has also been identified that a number of homegrown terrorists experience deep radicalization and is eager to connect in acts of brutality to progress their political aim. In addition, the country has taken effective strategies to stop these acts from being carried out at the comparatively primary phase (Ç?nar 2017, 97-121). Furthermore, the past has revealed that further terrorist association like Hezbollah for example has established their ability to begin violence on different countries' aim, resulting in elevated sufferer rates. As such, given the chance, Hezbollah may be ready to begin an attack on Australian soil, and therefore a present reasonable danger to Australia.

Chapter 4 - Conclusion on Homegrown Terrorism Australia

It has been concluded from the overall analyses that homegrown terrorism is one of the major issues for Australia. However, the country has made continuous efforts to identify the people who are connected with international terrorist groups. These terrorist groups caused mass causalities and high economic loss in the country. It has also been identified that these home-based terrorists take inspiration from large terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and others. The analysis also revealed that an ineffective response towards terrorism threat may affect the overall system and trust of the society. It is the responsibility of the government to develop effective counter-terrorism policies that may affect the intentions of home-based terrorists. Furthermore different attacks and several causalities show that terrorism is present in the country. It is highly crucial to detect the planning of such attacks before their execution. Furthermore, Australia is functioning insistently with its local and global partners to battle terrorism. The risk is global, and the country is organizing its reaction by building a coalition, escalating capability, and dropping vulnerabilities.

The country has made great progress towards global terrorism but homegrown terrorism is still a major threat of people. The analysis also highlighted that Terrorism engages the unlawful use or threatened use of force or hostility, and an intention to force people or regime by inducing terror in their populations. Other acts of community brutality can also be shocking to mental health. Persistent violence, such as recurring urban assaults, school gunfire, and office violence, is actions that influence small and huge, city, and rural communities. These actions have rudiments that may be comparable to violence in terms of emotional impact, and teaching learned from the reaction to violence may assist to notify responses to these other actions. Also, Terrorism and the risk of terrorism will have psychological consequences for a main portion of the population, not just a small minority. The analysis specified residents also provide funding and other necessary resources to these terrorist groups.

Furthermore, it is highly imperative to identify their intentions in order to prevent attacks. It has been identified that the major source of motivation is still unknown which inspire these individuals to commit violence in their native soil. Furthermore, there are different ways to stop terrorism in the country but the government must find the most effective strategy that can tackle homegrown terrorism in the most effective manner. The most effectual strategy will be stopping people from becoming a part of these terrorism groups. It is highly essential to identify the common source that inspires these people to commit violence and attacks. With the help of a comprehensive and strategic approach and effective policies, Australian government can tackle and eliminate the enlargement of home grown terrorism.

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